[310 cont.]

342 in and protect the interior of the tent from dust and the heat of the sun. The tents of ordinary people are of gray felt, and those of the great or the rich of white felt. But some sultans, the most powerful ones in the Middle and the Great Hordes, have theirs covered with red cloth and lined inside with fabrics of silk. The [565] poorest people, on the contrary, substitute mats of tree bark and leaves for the pieces of felt, and sometimes they even use reeds and grass.

352 The far side of the tent, opposite the door, is occupied by [291] chests covered with rugs. These serve for the storage of dresses, [411] robes, and other clothing. Rifles, sabers, bows, arrows, saddles, [415] harnesses, powderhorns, etc. are hung inside the tent, as well as towels, teapots, jugs, tursuks (kinds of sacks of hide), and frequently pieces of smoked horsemeat as well. The ground, which serves as the floor, is covered with rugs or pieces of felt. On these rugs great vases are arranged, kettles, wooden headboards [chevets] on which pillows are placed, and boxes of a special kind which are ornamented in different ways and in which sacks are placed which contain kumiss.

[493] A Kazak assembles and dismantles his tent in half an hour [231] and constantly carries it on the back of a camel to the places where he finds good pasturage and water for his herds. Thus he is more dependent upon his herds and studs than on anything else.

[233] [311] Later we will give a detailed description of their herds. ● 182 But it should be stated here that this kind of occupation determines all their social obligations and relations, so that no matter how one imagines a Kazak one can only see an armed shepherd in him. And the habit and taste for the pastoral life is the source of all his actions, both moral and physical.

233 The continual travels of the Kazaks and the change of loca- 152 tion does not tire them. On the contrary, they find in it a source 181 of pleasure and consider themselves lucky not to be attached to the soil. During the summer the nomadic life is really very pleasant, 121 but it is unbearable during the winter. During this season the 132 Kazak, surrounded on all sides by piles of snow, rarely emerge from their tents. There, huddled around the fire (1), they suffer almost

1. In places where there is no wood, they use animal dung for fuel.

These apparent contradictions arise because Kazakh society is an amalgam of kin and political relationships.

Soviet writers in Central Asia find it difficult to explain the inconsistencies in Kazakh society; this difficulty is due in part to the series of readymade categories of evolution which Communism teaches. They are dealing not with abstractions but with living people, whose lives are complex. The Kazakhs have lived on the margins of great empires—Persian, Chinese, Russian—for many centuries. They themselves have participated in great empires, their own and others. Not only the glory, but some of the institutions, have rubbed off on them; they have developed certain institutions which are normally part of states and empires. At times they have formed states and empires, and at times they have contracted to form smaller units.

During the 1920's, a group of Kazakh intellectuals, together with certain romantically disposed Russians, constructed a picture of Kazakh society in which each social unit formed a closely-knit cooperative core. All members of a village helped each other, since all were united by ties of blood and neighborhood. The Kazakh intellectuals included former leaders, such as Baitursunov and Bukeikhanov, of the Alash-Orda, the Kazakh political party of the period 1917-1922. Ryskulov and Sadvokasov, also Kazakhs, propounded the same idea; the Russian scholars Polochanskii, Kushner, and, as late as 1933, Fedorov continued along the same line.[1]

With the onset of collectivization, the Soviet government could no longer let these theories continue unopposed. In 1926 Moscow began to denounce the notion of the persistence of primeval communist conditions among the Kazakhs into the era of the Russian Revolution. The Soviet boss of Kazakhstan, Goloshchekin, attacked the concept of the Kazakh nomadic village as a communal, cooperative, undifferentiated whole. Between 1928 and 1930 the government of Kazakhstan handed over each year to the GPU hundreds of Kazakh families classified as enemies of the workers. The campaign to exterminate the rich Kazakhs as exploiters of the poor intensified between 1930 and 1933. The aim of this campaign was to bring the Kazakh herdsman into collective farm life, to settle him down as a tiller of the soil, as well as to find the equivalents among the Kazakhs of the rich peasants of Russia. The aul was equated by Goloshchekin with a peasant village anywhere; the wealthy Kazakh villager was equated with the Kulak, and thus regarded as subject to liquidation.[2]

This policy became the official line, and the forces advocating the theory of communal economy and polity were silenced. One theory advanced in support of the new line stated that the Tsarist colonialists supported the village leaders as a counterpoise to the khans and the sultans, and used the local leader as a lever to crush the rule of the khans. According to this theory, the khans were of foreign birth and the village leaders, pictured as allies of the Tsars, were of Kazakh birth.[3]

[1] Tagabaev, 1934, pp. 6-8, 33.
[2] Goloshchekin, 1931, pp. 177-198, 208.
[3] Tagabaev, 1934, pp. 38-39.

it out. The attempts by the Soviet regime to cause the Kazakhs to conform to their plan are trial and error procedures which sometimes succeed, sometimes fail. They work where the Kazakhs accept, they fail where the Kazakhs are able to reject Soviet culture. Where the Kazakhs accept, it is because they already possessed cultural institutions similar to those which the Soviet regime wished them to have. The ease with which the Kazakh family and village organization moved over into the collective farm structure illustrates this. Both the traditional Kazakh and the Soviet village and rural family are based on close internal cooperation; the core population of both the prerevolutionary and the modern village are kinsmen.

Alternatively, the Kazakhs accept Soviet culture where their native institutions have been crushed and the Soviet institution simply imposed from above. An instance of this is the class structure and the government structure related to it. The Kazakh ruling class, the hereditary nobility, was driven out, and the corresponding form of local government collapsed. It was replaced by the present regime of Soviet functionaries and the Soviet state structure within which they take their places. It seems generally true that the small-scale institutions of the steppe peoples such as family and kinship are stabler, more constant than the larger ones, such as state and empire.[1]

The Soviet culture has been rejected by the Kazakhs where no native customs or institutions existed upon which the new pattern could be imposed. Thus the Soviet concept of a fraternity of nationalities combined to form the USSR has no place in Kazakh life. The Kazakhs have had no especially friendly relations with the Russians; on the contrary, in the 19th century they hated the Russians as colonialists and frequently rose in revolt against them. At present, relations have not improved; the Kazakhs have no reason—political, economic, or cultural—to accept the Russian regime more closely now than they did in the past. If one finds no evidence today of revolts in Central Asia, it is because Soviet control over the Kazakhs is far more efficient than that of the Tsars. And if there were revolts or other expressions of mass unrest, resentment, feelings of injustice, and the like, word of them would not reach the western world until the Soviet press chose to mention them.

The theory of controlled acculturation remains a theory, the western formulation of Soviet policy. It is in contrast with the western approach, which does not conceive of culture in terms of a controlling plan. Kazakh culture has been disrupted through incorporation into the Soviet Union; there are gaps in the fabric of their society resulting from the rapid acculturation. The traditional has not been entirely replaced by the new. Two reasons may be adduced for this: resistance by the Kazakhs, and faulty or inadequate planning by the Soviets. The deficiencies in the planning have tended to increase the degree of the resistance.

[1] Krader (77), 1953.

Mukanov offers another measure of the impact of Islam in his reference to the Shariat. The Shariat is technically the canonical law of Islam. Unlike the canonical law of western civilization, however, it governs the entire life of the devout Moslem, not merely his relationship to his church. The Shariat governs, in theory, the daily habits of the Moslem, prescribes whom he may or may not marry, and sets forth the entire body of social relations and controls—between master and servant, man and woman, parent and child, ruler and governed. The fact that the very existence of this body of rules of conduct is little known among the nomadic Kazakhs is of great significance. Taken in combination with other less striking bits of evidence, it points to the superficiality of the Kazakhs' adoption of Islam. Although Moslem observance and practice is everywhere more formalized in urban than in rural surroundings, for the nomadic Kazakhs it is not merely less systematic; it is also less important.

KAZAKH FOLK RELIGIONS

At the end of the 19th century a Russian, Poiarkov, traveled among the Kazakhs in the northeast of their domain, in Semirechie in the territory of the Great Horde. He learned that these Kazakhs had not seen a mullah, or Moslem cleric, until some 15 or 20 years before his travels. In the 1890's mullahs were still exceedingly rare among the Kazakhs who lived near the Chinese border. Few Kazakhs knew Moslem prayers, or if they did, only inaccurately; few knew the Koran.[1]

Because he did not overestimate the influence of Islam on the Kazakhs, Poiarkov was able to supply positive details of the religions of these people. He distinguished between two layers, the remains of the old folk religion and an overlay of the new Islamic faith among the literate. The most important of the old beliefs or cults is that centered around the soul of the deceased ancestor, arvak among the Kirgiz, aurak among the Kazakhs. These ancestors represent a strong force among their living descendants and are prayed to and invoked in time of need. The ancestor cult forms an integral part of the traditional social structure of the Kazakhs, built as it is around the genealogy and the preservation of the descent line. However, according to Poiarkov, the cult of ancestors was weakening under the impact of Islam on the one hand and Russian acculturation on the other.[2]

The term shamanism is often mentioned in connection with the Kazakhs. In this religion the leader, or shaman, is ecstatic, hysterical, marked by abnormal behavior (not only according to the standards of western society, but also according to his own); he is considered to be possessed by and have control over the world of the spirits, and by entering into relations with them can use them to his own will. He cures illnesses, has powers of divination, can avert misfortune and the evil eye. For many centuries he has been far in advance of western medicine by recognizing psychosomatic disorders; he concentrates on them, and so

[1] Poiarkov, 1891, pp. 21-22.
[2] Ibid., pp. 23-28.

avoids ailments which his power cannot cure, such as a broken leg. The shaman generally sets himself into a state of trance, in which he projects his soul into the spirit realm and there discovers the secret cause of some human disorder, cattle plague, or whatever problem faces him. The Kazakh shaman, called bagsha, belongs to a hereditary profession. The patrilineal organization of Kazakh society is reflected in this folk religion: "The profession of bagsha is transmitted usually from father to son; this inheritance pattern bears the name of bagshylyk."[1]

This form of shamanism is widespread among the Turks and the Mongols, where the former have not been absorbed into the world of Islam, or the latter into the world of Buddhism. Kazakh shamanism is connected most intimately with the social organization of the people. The practice of animal sacrifices conducted by the shaman in the case of severe or dangerous disease, the shaman's use of the drum or tambourine (Kazakh dabyl) in his ceremonies, the passing of a shaman's spirits to his son when the shaman dies, are all part of the fabric of Turko-Mongol religion and society, just as is the cult of ancestors. However, the Kazakhs have not lived in a vacuum sealed off from the Moslem world, for they have formed part of ancient empires thoroughly Islamic in faith; the empire of Tamerlane, to which the ancestors of the Kazakhs belonged in the 14th and 15th centuries, was a Moslem empire. The bagsha's spirits are known among the Kazakhs as djinns, a Moslem term for spirits; the bagsha frequently invokes Allah, and the Arabic devil, Shaitan, is accursed and admonished.[2]

Elements of Islam have thus slipped into the folk religion of the Kazakhs, a process over which the Russians have had no control; Tsarist recognition of Islam was not needed to introduce these elements among the Kazakhs.

For an exact appraisal of the role of Islam among the Kazakhs, another ancient practice must be examined. The Kazakhs have traditionally believed in and made pilgrimages to holy places. In Central Asia one finds a vast number of such places, tombs of saints or of other holy men. These tombs, called mazar by the Kazakhs and Kirgiz, stand alone or together with several others within an earthen enclosure which forms a sacred ossuary.[3] Among devout Moslems visits to these places can even replace the pilgrimage to Mecca.

In recent years the Soviet regime has been concerned about this practice. The Party Committee of the Pavlodar Region in May 1952 called for strengthening of the natural sciences and of antireligious propaganda, with special reference to a mazar in the Bayan-Aul District, which has existed for many years. The Academy of Sciences of Kazakhstan was instructed to put an end to the legends regarding the saint in the tomb. The Academy formed a committee to visit the sepulchre and examine the matter, but the committee limited itself to inscribing certain remarks in the visitor's book beside the tomb. It was denounced by the Party for its lack of effort.[4]

[1] Castagne (27), 1930, pp. 67-73.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 67-73.
[3] Castagne (29), 1931, pp. 46-50.
[4] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 24 May 52.

the only means by which, in the present context, the literary, artistic, and scientific expressions of Kazakh culture can develop. Kazakh economic life and material culture today are best described as reflecting a certain dispiritedness. This dispirited attitude underlies the apathy which allows skilled herdsmen to let their herds fall apart—failing to ensure that cows continue to calve, neglecting to shear their sheep, not bringing mares to foal.

These various facts bespeak an unwillingness on the Kazakhs' part to participate in the Soviet life as well as a holding-off policy by Moscow. In the field of native handicrafts a similar situation prevails. Kazakh craftsmen had until recently a degree of skill in rugmaking and felt-making (largely a woman's occupation), leatherwork, and certain metal crafts such as brassworking. These crafts they shared with other Central Asiatic peoples, both Turkic and Iranian. This has all disappeared. The Kazakhs have lost contact with their own culture; they have been forbidden to express interest in their own past.

The Kazakhs recovered splendidly from the losses of World War I and the Revolution, rebuilding their herding strength in the next decade. During this period they were left more or less alone by Moscow. During 1929-1933 the Kazakhs again suffered tremendous losses. In the ensuing period they were not left alone, and they have not recovered, even after 25 years. Never in the history of Soviet Kazakhstan has a plan for herding been fulfilled. In 1952 a partial exception did occur—the plan for horses was fulfilled—but only, according to Shaiakhmetov, through huge investments by the state.[1]

INDUSTRY

The industrial development of Kazakhstan has proceeded along the line of extraction of natural resources, primarily metals and fuels (see Figure 2). The metal extraction has a history which precedes the Revolution, and is almost exclusively in the field of nonferrous metals; to this day there is very little iron mining and ferrous industry in Kazakhstan.

The chief nonferrous metals are lead and zinc, mined in the Altai Mountains and near Taldy-Kurgan; copper, mined north of Lake Balkhash, in the vicinity of Dzhezkazgan, and between Akmolinsk and Pavlodar; and various deposits of manganese, bauxite, nickel, gold, phosphorus, chromite, and mineral salts. Iron is mined near the Sary-Su and at Kustanay.

Kazakhstan has both solid and liquid fuel resources. Large deposits of coal are scattered throughout the central and northern parts of the republic, from the Mangyshlak peninsula in the west to the Chinese border in the east; the most important, ranking third in the Soviet Union, is that at Karaganda. Lignite is found in the extreme south, at Lenger and Chimkent, but in small amounts relative to the solid fuels in the republic. Oil is found along the Caspian shore near the port of Guryev, and in the steppe between the Emba and Ural rivers.[2]

[1] *Ibid.*, 21 Sep 52.
[2] Pal'gov, 1953, pp. 126-135.

[Great Horde]

The structures larger than the clan must be set aside as of a different order than the smaller units.

The clan, too, can only be touched on briefly, because it faces two ways from a structural point of view. It is of moment to analyze it, albeit summarily, because it throws light on certain general features of consanguinity and affinity in the steppe society. But it was at the same time a social unit of a different order than the lineage, the village, or the family. By the 19th century, especially the latter part, it was moribund; it was rooted in the past, and was in a real sense the anvil upon which the structure of the state was hammered. It was in fact a state in minuscule, with a ruling stratum, the nobles, and subordinate strata, the commoners and slaves. There was a religious cleavage in slave-making; within Islam, the Kazakhs were Sunnite in belief; they took slaves among the Shiite Moslems, Lamaist Kalmuks, and Christians.[69]

Certain structural principles which the clan shares with other Kazakh descent groups have been discussed above; among them are its corporate character, the

[69] Levchine, 330. While their religion was dominantly Islamic, specifically Sunnite, there were also important elements of Manichaeism and of shamanism among them. The latter doctrinary forces, however, corresponded to no pattern in their loyalties or enslavements. In general, Islam was a late and superficial feature of Kazakh religion and culture.

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182 principle of patrilineal descent, and the mode of inheritance which operates differentially, with certain rights of primogeniture, certain rights of ultimogeniture, and certain rights of equal inheritance. Other principles concern the clan alone, among them the genealogical charter which among other things was an expression of the myth of clan origin and also served to validate the membership of an individual in the clan. However, the lineage and the extended family participate in this principle of clan organization through the very architecture of the clan--its pyramidal form, to apply the imagery of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard. The clan was composed of differentially ranked lineages, and the lineages in turn of villages and of families, the highest rank being that of the line through the eldest sons.

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565 The clan was divided into noble and common strata, which marks it off from the lineage, and other lesser units. These strata have been aptly characterized as estates by Kharuzin[70] and distinguished by the Kazakhs, as by all steppe peoples as different colored patrilineal descent lines called sŭk (literally, bone). These "bones" were the white or noble estate, and the black or common, and the principle whereby they were distinguished was identical with that of the Khalkha,

[70] Kharuzin, op. cit., col. 47.